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RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO ASSIGNED COUNSEL IN NON-CAPITAL
FELONY PROSECUTIONS-GHOLSON v. COMMONWEALTH
Cholwn v. Commonwealth,1 a recent Kentucky case, deals with two important questions, to-wit: (1) whether one accused of a non-capital felony has the
right to assistance of counsel assigned by the trial court, and (2) whether, if the
former right exists, it must be called to the attention of the accused so that he
may avail himself thereof. It is believed that the solution of these questions by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals in the Gholson case marks a radical departure
from the preexisting law in Kentucky as well as a laudable stride toward achieving
substantial justice and equality for all defendants regardless of financial position
or education. It is with that case and its significance that this note is primarily
concerned. However, it seems apposite prior to embarking on an exposition
thereof to examine the status of the right to assigned counsel as it existed
throughout the United States in the federal, state, and particularly in the Kentucky courts, at the time of the decision in the principal case. An understanding
of the general problem in its national scope constitutes a prerequisite to intelligent
evaluation of the Kentucky court's decision.
BIGHT

To

ASSIGNED COUNSEL IN FEDERA4L COURTS

The right of a defendant in a criminal case "
to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense" is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. It must be said, however, that nothing appears therein to compel
the conclusion that the phrase means more than that an accused who has employed counsel has the right to utilize his assistance in his defense. The words
themselves do not necessarily indicate that it is the duty of the federal government, acting through its courts, to appoint counsel to represent defendants who
are financially unable to make an employment. Similar state constitutional provisions have been interpreted in the light of this fact as meamng no more than
the words, themselves, necessarily imply; that the accused may employ counsel
who may represent him at all stages of the prosecution.- The Supreme Court
of the United States has said that this viewpoint is not unreasonable, pointing to
the historical background wherein those accused of felony in England were until
1836 denied the assistance of counsel even when employed by the defendants
themselves.'
Following the adoption of the Sixth Amendment, Congress, realizing the
critical importance of counsel to defendants, whether rich or poor, when charged
with serious crime, enacted a statute which imposed the duty upon federal courts
308 Ky. 82, 212 SA 2d 537 (1948).
People v. Haddad, 316 Mich. 556, 11 N.W. 2d 240 (1943); Reed v. State, 143
Miss. 686, 109 So. 715 (1926); Commonwealth ex rel. McGlinn v. Smith, 344 Pa. 41,
21 A. 2d 1 (1942): State v. Jones, 172 S. C. 129, 173 S.E. 77 (1934); Holdon v. State,
89 Tc\. Cr. R. 628, 255 SA, 187 (1921). See Betts v. Brady 316 U.S. 455, 468 (1942);
Powell v. Alabana, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932). In the following cases a constitutional
right to asigned counsel was recognized: Knox County Council v. State, 217 Ind.
193, 29 N.E. 2d -105 (1940): Baker v. State, 9 Okla., Cr. 62. 130 Pac. 820 (1912).
1' e Betts v. Brady, 316 U,S, 455, 466 (1942).
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to assign counsel to unrepresented defendants to be tried for capital offenses'
Although subsequently it had become almost the universal practice for the federal
courts to assign counsel to unrepresented and indigent defendants in all serious
criminal cases including non-capital felonies, not until 1938 did the Supreme
Court of the United States decide that the Sixth Amendment requires such assignment. That year in the celebrated case of Johnson v. Zerbst,- wbich rejected the
hitherto narrow interpretation of the Sixth Amendment suggested supra, it was
held that the accused in any felony case has a constitutional right to assigned
counsel if unable to make an employment, that the right is fundamental, and that
it can be lost only by intelligent waiver. The following is an important excerpt
from the Court's opinion:
"The
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good
or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without
the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge,
and convicted upon incompetent evidence.
He lacks both the
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though
he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step of the proceedings against him." '
Shortly after the decision in the Johnson case the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were enacted, Rule 44 of which provides:
"If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the
court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to
represent him at every stage of the proceedings unless he elects to
proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel."
Thus, under both the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the Johnson case, and under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure which codified that decision, the absolute rights of one tried for felony
in federal courts to be informed of his right to counsel, and to be assigned counsel,
if he desires but cannot otherwise obtain the same, are clear.
RIGHT To AssiGNED COUNSEL IN STATE COURTS PREDICATED
UPON-THE FOURTEENTH AI]ENDIMENT

Because the Sixth Amendment does not apply to state courts, but only to
those of the federal government,- one accused of felony who would complain that
the failure of a state court to appoint counsel was violative of his rights under
the Federal Constitution must rely upon the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Since most state courts have long recognized the necessity of counsel as an ingredient of fair hearings by their customary and common practice of
assigning lawyers to indigent felony defendants whether state law requires such
1 State. 118 (1790), 18 U.S.C.A. sec. 563 (1927).
r 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Id. at 463.
7 Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U.S. 164, 172 (1906); Twitchell v. Pennsylvania. 7
Wall. 321 (U.S. 1868).
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assignment or not, one might expect that any departure therefrom in a felony
case would constitute per se a departure from due process. But aside from that
reasoning, the conclusion that due process requires counsel in state courts would
seem almost inescapable in view of the language of the Johnson case, wherein
the Supreme Court unequivocably said that the right to counsel is fundamental
and explaned that even the intelligent and educated layman cannot defend himself adequately. If this be true in federal court, it must be equally true in the
courts of the several states. Notithstanding these considerations, five of the
nine justices who presently sit (June, 1949) as our highest tribunal, and thus a bare
majority, have not adhered to this trend of reasoning and have consistently denied
that a state court's failure to assign counsel constitutes, in itself, a denial of a constitutional right. Instead, the majority justices have adopted the view that, in addition to a state court's failure to supply the accused with counsel, there must be other aggravating circumstances sufficient to convince the Court that the proceedings
were
offensive to common and fundamental ideas of fairness and
right
Such a doctrine must, of course, necessitate the decision of each
case upon its own peculiar aggregate of facts and circumstances.
The first hint of that approach appeared in the famous case of Powell v.
Alabama," in which the accused, charged with the capital offense of rape, were
friendless negro youths, strangers in the community of trial, without means to
obtain counsel, ignorant and illiterate, and-the subjects of public hostility. Under
these and other aggravating circumstances, the Supreme Court held that failure
of the trial court to effectively assign counsel amounted to a denial of due process
of law, but expressly predicated its decision upon the circumstances mentioned.
The Court then said: "Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecutions,
or under other circumstances, we need not determine. All that it is necessary
now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case, where the defendant
is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of maang his own
defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the
duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a
necessary prerequisite of due process of law
"" Recently the Supreme Court
has intimated that it now regards assignment of counsel to unrepresented defendants in every capital case as constituting a requisite of due process." Whether
this is, in fact, the Court's meaning is not free from doubt.
Following the Powell case all decisions, at least in non-capital felony cases,
have depended upon whether failure to assign counsel was or was not accompanied
by additional factors which enhanced the unfairness which, in the opinion of
many, inheres in lack of counsel alone. Thus, in Betts v. Brady' a divided
Supreme Court ruled that refusal by a state court to assign counsel upon the request of one accused of robbery (a non-capital offense) did not constitute denial
of due process of lav where the only defense was alibi, the defendant was mature,
trial was before the court without a jury, and the only issue was the veracity
of the witnesses. Another case of more recent origin in which relief was denied
by the majority of the Court upon the same theoretical considerations was Bute v.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
287 U.S. 45 (1932).

11Id.

at 71.

"See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 6-10, 674 (19-18).

' 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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Illinots.3 There it was held that in the absence of a showing in the common law
record of aggravating circumstances, the Illinois court was under no duty to
inform the accused to his right to counsel, to inquire as to his desire for the same,
or to assign counsel in the absence of a request therefor, appearing in the record.
Had the accused requested counsel the result, judging by the Betts case, should
have been unaffected.
In another series of decisions subsequent to the Powell case the Court has
held that due process was denied by the trial court's failure to assign counsel plus
the presence of aggravating circumstances.'
In each case these circumstances
included one or more of the following factors: (1) defendant's ignorance of legal
procedure, (2) failure of the court to inform the defendant of the charges against
him, (3) trickery of the prosecution in obtaining a plea of guilty, (4) youthfulness of the defendant, (5) partiality, carelessness, or msinformation on the part
of the trial judge, (6) precipitancy in the proceedings, and (7) technical difficulties inhering in refutation of the particular charge, or in determining the
degree of the 6ffense.
In explaining its position that each case must depend for its solution upon
the totality of circumstances, the Supreme Court has said that it does not feel
justified in imposing an inflexible rule requiring counsel upon the states when
it has only recently (1938, in Johnson v. Zerbst) recognized such a rule as applicable to the federal courts." It is quite possible that the reluctance of the Court
to extend the right of assigned counsel to defendants in state courts by means of
a retroactive decision under the elastic due process clause stems primarily from
the fear of the majority that prison doors might be thrown open to dangerous
crinunals who were convicted by state courts without benefit of counsel, and who
are now cooling their heels in state prisons. This reason was suggested by the
Court in Foster v. Illinots." It is submitted that it is doubtful whether this consideration should deter the Court from guaranteeing the same fundamental right
to those tried in state courts which it has felt obligated to guarantee to others
tried in federal courts. If assistance of counsel is, in fact, necessary to the conduct of a fair trial, which fact has been admitted by the Court in the Johnson
case, and by lawyers and laymen in every day conversation, then it must be said
to follow that those convicted and imprisoned without benefit of counsel, and
without waiver thereof, were denied common justice or due process, where therefor illegally tned and convicted, and must consequently be regarded as innocent
until such subsequent time as they may be tried and convicted legitimately. It
is no answer to say that evidence might be difficult to obtain after the lapse of
many years, and therefore some who might be guilty rmght ultimately go free to endanger society. Until a defendant is fairly tried and found wanting the presumption of innocence obtains. But however that may be, it suffices to reflect that the
majority of the Court, as it is now constituted, still refuses to say that the Fourteenth Amendment requires assignment of counsel to the accused in every
felony case.
-333 U.S. 640 (1948).
14 Non-capital cases: Townsend V. Burke, 334 U.S. 736
(1948): Wade v. Mayo
334 U.S. 672 (1948); Rice v. Olsen, 324 U.S. 786 (1945); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S.
329 (1911). Capital cases: Hawk v. Olsen, 326 U.S. 271 (1945); Thomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
"5Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466 (1942).
6332 U.S. 134, 139 (1946).

STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS
RIGHT To COUNSEL PREDICATED UPON STATE
CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES

Since it is evident from the foregoing discussion that the Sixth Amendment
does not affect proceedings in state courts and that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires assignment of counsel to the accused in a non-capital case, only where
there arc certain aggravating circumstances difficult to define it must therefore
be of great importance to one convicted without counsel whether the law of the
prosecuting state required such assignment. While the constitutions of all states
save Virginia contain provisions similar to that of the Sixth Amendment,'- by
reason of the interpretation placed upon them by most state courts, the provisions
mean no more than that the accused is entitled to be represented by counsel
employed by hin." For this reason a defendant who insists that he has been
unlawfully convicted by reason of a state court's failure to supply counsel must
usually take his chances relying upon the Fourteenth Amendment in the hope
that either the high court of his state or the Supreme Court of the United States
will find a violation of due process, or he must found Ins contention upon a state
statute requiring that counsel be assigned. Many states have such statutes, some
of them applicable to capital cases only, while others apply to non-capital cases
as well.'
It is important to note that even in those states having statutes purporting to
guarantee the right to assigned counsel in felony cases, this right is sometimes
rendered useless to certain defendants by judicial construction. Thus, it is held
in a number of states that there is no duty resting upon the court to assign counsel
to unrepresented defendants unless they initiate affirmative action by requesting
the same."' It is evident that under a statute so interpreted an accused who is
ignorant of his rights may forfeit them. The Illinois statute,2' for example, provides that every person charged with felony shall be allowed counsel if he states
upon oath that he cannot obtain counsel. In constrmng tIs law the Illinois court
has ruled that there is no duty upon the trial court to inform the defendant of
his statutory right, or to assign counsel unless the defendant files an affidavit
stating lis need.R Where such affidavit does not appear in the record upon
appeal the defendant cannot complain.
It is obvious that this position is untenable, not technically perhaps, but as
a practical instrumentality of justice, because it assumnes that an accused knows
both the substantive law (his rights) and the procedural law (lus remedies)
which is usually not the fact, and which, if it were, would obviate the need for
counsel altogether. Thus it is clear that in some states wherein the right to
assigned counsel depends upon statutory authority this right falls far short of
what is desirable, if not necessary, to the realization of substantial justice for
all alike.
Although in Bute v. lllinois the Supreme Court held that failure of an
"7 See Bettas v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 467-468 (1942).
"Supra, note 2.
"'See Betts v.Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 477-480 (1942).
-"State v. Williams, 162 La. 590, 110 So. 766 (1927); State v. Terry, 201 Mo. 697,
100 S.W. 432 (1907).
"'iLL. REv. S[AT., c. 38, sec. 730 (1947).
'People v. Wilson, 399 Ill. 437, 78 N.E. 2d 512 (1948); People v. Bute, 396 Ill.
5XX, 72 N.E. 2d 813 (1947).
-333 U.S. 640 (1948).
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Illinois court to assign counsel to a felony defendant where the record did not
show that counsel was requested and where the Court failed to find aggravating
circumstances did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the high court of
Illinois subsequently sensed injustice and improvised a remedy. This consisted
of the adoption of a court rule which purports to prevent future abuse of those
defendants who do not know the procedural requirements of the law. It requires
the courts, among other things, to inform the accused of ins right to assigned
counsel and to make entries in the records sufficient to show that tins was done."1
Another shortcoming of the statutory approach is that statutes, like court
rules, are not usually retroactive. Thus, while the legislature may decide that
representation by counsel is a necessary element of a fair trial and, pursuant to
that decision, enact a law to equip future felony defendants with lawyers, unless
such statute is in express terms made retroactive, helpless defendants convicted
prior to this legislative action are unaffected.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

IN KENTUCKY

1 Iu1011 TO Ti-mEDECisION IN

CHOLSON V. COMI-MONWEALTH
Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution in words similar to those of other
state constitutions provides that an accused "
has the right to be heard by
himself and counsel." There is no statute guaranteeing the right to assigned
counsel either in capital or non-capital cases. Nevertheless, as early as 1886 in
Turner v. Commonwealth the Kentucky Court of Appeals recognized a duty on
the part of the courts to make such assigmuent. In that case the defendant was
convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment from which judgment
appeal was taken, but subsequently disinssed by the court for failure to prosecute
the appeal within the time prescribed. Thereafter, having delayed eleven years,
the defendant moved that the appeal be redocketed on the ground that lie had
not been represented by counsel upon his appeal and that the trial court coinmited prejudicial error. The Court of Appeals in denying the motion said:
"A suggestion that the prisoner is without counsel or
unable to employ one would require the interposition of the court in
his behalf but after the lapse of so many years, although confined
within the walls of a prison it would be a dangerous precedent to
entertain such motions, or to rehear cases by reason of the neglect of
counsel, or want.of ability on the part of the condemned to make an
emplo)ment."'
The Court then stated that the right of appeal is not a constitutional one and
that the rules for prosecuting appeals must be complied with. Thus, while the
Court of Appeals did recognize a duty resting upon the courts to assign counsel,
perhaps it did not recognize a correlative right of the condemned arising therefrom, in that it denied relief for the reasons stated.
That the duty of courts to assign counsel to needy defendants and a correlative right of such persons to have counsel assigned stems from the Kentucky
Constitution was first suggested in Williams v. Commonwealth.' In that case the
lllinois Supreme Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Rule 27A (1918).
89 Ky. 78, 1 S.XV. 475 (1886).
- Id. at - 1 S.W at 476.
-'

t

33 Ky. Law Rep. 330, 110 S.V 339 (1908).
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defendant who was convicted of robbery without aid of counsel, appealed on
the grounds that counsel was not assigned, that lie did not realize at the time
that he was on trial, thinking only his co-defendant was in jeopardy, and that
trial with another was prejudicial to hinm. In reversing the Court of Appeals
said:
"We, however, do not understand the provisions of the
Constitution
to require the court to appoint counsel for a defendant charged with felony where he does not desire the aid of
counsel, and when the court can see that the person charged is a
person of at least ordinary intelligence and can fully appreciate the
position vhich lie occupies, but in a case like this, where the defendant
is without education and has not mind enough to know that he was
placed in jeopardy, we are of the opimon that it was the court's duty
to see that lie was properly represented.' (Italics writers)
In English v. Com nonwealth' it was said that the trial court should assign
counsel where it appears that the defendant is without counsel unless the defendant declines, but, with the exception of that case, all those subsequent to
Williams v. Commonwealth, supra, were concerned with emasculating the constitutional right which had just been recognized. Thus in Grogan v. Commonwealth'" the Court of Appeals held that either the accused must expressly request
counsel or it must appear that he was intellectually or educationally deficient if
lie is to be heard to complain upon appeal that an attorney was not assigned to
hino. Since neither of these facts appeared in the record, the defendant's conviction obtained without counsel was affirmed.
In Hamnlin v. Corninonwealth" the Kentucky Court of Appeals embraced a
procedural device for baring enforcement of the right to assigned counsel which
seems at least as unreasonable, if not more so, than that concocted bv the Illinois
court in construing its state statute which has been mentioned supra. The facts

of the Hamnin case were as follows: The accused was convicted of malicious
striking and wounding with intent to ,il, but was unrepresented by counsel.
His appeal was based upon the contention that failure of the trial court to assign
counsel when requested by luIn deprived him of is constitutional rights under
Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. The bill of exceptions certified by the
trial judge showed that the same complaint was made in the motion and grounds
for a new trial which was filed below, and that the defendant filed an affidavit
in support thereof, but that the trial judge did not certify in the said bill that
the matters set forth occurred on or before the trial of the case. The Court in
affimuing the conviction made the following statements:
"It is not the established rule that as a prerequisite to our
right to determine whether the denial of a motion was prejudicial,
it is necessary that the lower court, or by-standers, certify to us in the
bill of exceptions the fact that the motion was made and overruled
and that the complaimng party, at the time, excepted to the ruling
of the court in respect thereto."'
When the rule announced by the Grogan case is considered in conjunction
-Id. at -

110 S.W. at 340.

="216 Ky. 608, 288 S.W 320 (1926).
- 222 Ky.-18. 1 S.W 2d 779 (1927).
287 Ky. 22, 152 S.V. 2d 297 (1941).
; Id. at 24, 15 S.W 2d at 298.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

with that of the Hamlin case the practical effect is astounding. The ordinary
layman who knows little about substantive law and still less about procedure, in
order to avail himself of his recognized constitutional right to assistance of counsel
which has heretofore once been denied hun, must know at hi peril that while
before the trial court he must (1) request counsel (2) except to the demal of
his request (3) move for a new trial following conviction (4) except to the
denial of his motion (5) and have either the trial judge or a by-stander certify
in the bill of exceptions, which presumably the defendant must write, that all
these things occurred before or during the trial. That even a very intelligent
layman would not know these things without inquiring is almost certain, and that
the average man would not be eqmpped to deal with them without the most
solicitious help from the court is surer still. This was the status of a fundamental
constitutional right in Kentucky before the enlightened and laudable decision in
Qholson v. Commonwealth.
RICHT TO COUNSEL IN KENTUCKY UNDER THE DEcisiON IN
CHOLSON V. COMMONWEALTH

The pertinent facts in Gholson v. Commonwealth were these: The accused,
Ward Gholson, aged 22, was searched by two policemen, which search revealed
the presence of a pistol concealed in Gholson s boot. The search was unlawful
because the officers had no search warrant and because Gholson had committed
no offense in their presence. When brought to trial on a charge of carrying a
concealed weapon the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years
imprisonment. After conviction he probably secured the services of an attorney,
for he filed a motion and grounds for a new trial based upon affidavits by himself
and the examining judge stating the above facts and, in addition thereto, stating
that he was not advised by the trial court of his legal rights in the premises, that
he could not afford to employ an attorney, that counsel was not assigned him
by the court, and that lie was not guilty of the offense charged. No counter
affidavits were filed. The motion for a new trial was denied and Gholson appealed. Upon consideration of the case the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court. After discussing the right to counsel under the former Kentucky decisions,
the Court said that while it found no fault with the procedural rule in the Hamlin
case supra, as a general proposition, and that civil rules of procedure apply as
well to criminal cases, proceeded to make the following important statements:
however, in the case at bar, we are dealing with a
sacred and constitutional right of one accused of a felony; namely,
the right to be given a fair and impartial trial before a jury composed
of his peers. Furthermore, an accused has the right under Section 11
of the Constitution to be heard by himself and counsel. It is true
that the right to be represented by counsel may be waived by an
accused, but the waiver must be made 'intelligently, competently,
understandingly, and voluntarily.
The court then concluded:
"In addition to legal rights and guarantees common justice demands that every person accused of a felony be given a fair
and impartial trial. This would include the informing of an accused
308 Ky. 82, 212 S.V 2d 537 (1948).
Id. at 86, 212 S.W 2d at 539.
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at the beginning of his trial by the judge relative to his legal rights
and guarantees; and especially is this true where a plea of guilty is
offered and entertained. It is incumbent upon the trial judge to
determine whether the waiver of a right to be represented by counsel
is made 'intelligently, competently, understandingly, and voluntarily.
In the absence of such a showing, as is revealed by the record in the
case at bar, we think the accused should be granted a new trial."
Undoubtedly in arriving at its conclusion in the principal case the Court of
Appeals was fully aware that had Gholson been represented by counsel he would
probably have been advised to plead not guilty as the evidence procured by the
arresting officers, having been obtained by illegal search, would not have been
admissible upon the trial over the defendant's objection. Knowing nothing of
the law, however, and having no lawyer to inform him, the defendant did what
many in his circumstances have probably done. He pleaded guilty to a charge
of whwh, in contemplation of law, he was not guilty. Thus lie subjected himself
to punishment which others, able to secure legal advice, would have avoided.
It is this common inequality under the lawv which arises either from ignorance or
poverty which the Court of Appeals sought to redress.
From the Ghoi'on case the following conclusions may be drawn with regard
to the right of a felony defendant to have counsel assigned: (1) the right is
derived from Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution and should therefore be
retroactive in effect; (2) it is complete in that it includes the supplemental right
to be informed thereof by the trial judge; (3) it is unfettered by any requirement
that the defendant initiate affirmative action in the trial court in order to avail
himself thereof; and (4) it is enforceable upon appeal in the sense that failure to
conform to unimportant procedural mceties will not block review. These things
being true, it would seem that Gholson v. Commonwealth is the Kentucky counterpart of Johnson v. Zerbst. Thus in the Kentucky courts as in the federal courts,
the benefits of representation by trained counsel are no longer a privilege to be
granted or withheld by the trial judge at his pleasure, but are constitutional rights
belonging to the citizen of which he may not be deprived without his intelligent
consent, Similar decisions by other state courts might render moot the controversial question of the place of assigned counsel in due process of law, upon the
solution of which the Supreme Court of the United States is still almost evenly
divided. It would seem lughlv desirable that the states themselves take the
initiative in overhauling their criminal procedure instead of leaving the fundamental rights of their citizens in such condition that they must depend for enforcement upon further invasion by the Supreme Court of that domain traditionallv belonging to the sovereign states alone.
Nonns W

1(1I.at 88, 212 S.,. 2d at 540.
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